Skip to main content
Back
Intelligence product Security cluster Standing brief IA-HTI-SEC-REG-001

Haiti Gang Threat Registry

A structured, continuously maintained assessment of the armed groups operating across Haiti: who they are, where they operate, how they sustain themselves, and how the security picture is changing. Every entry is analyst-verified and carries its sources and a confidence rating.

InterAmitica updates this registry on a rolling basis. The page refreshes every 5 hours.
How we assess
Threat picture

The situation in brief

These are widely reported open-source figures on the scale of armed-group control in Haiti. They set the context for the group-by-group registry below. Figures are ranges because sources differ; treat them as orders of magnitude, not precise counts.

~200
Armed groups estimated to operate nationally
Open-source reporting, 2025-26
70-90%
Share of Port-au-Prince under gang control or influence
UN and open-source reporting
2
Major coalitions (G9 and G-Pep) under the Viv Ansanm alliance
UNODC, 2026
Artibonite
Central agricultural region with sustained rural gang activity
OHCHR, 2026

These context figures are maintained by InterAmitica and are separate from the analyst-entered registry records, which each carry their own sourcing below.

Standing profiles

The armed groups and coalitions

These are InterAmitica's standing profiles of the principal armed groups operating in Haiti, compiled from open-source reporting and cross-checked before publication. They form the fixed backbone of this report. The live registry further below carries newer, individually dated entries as our analysts publish them. Fields shown as "Not assessed" mean corroborated detail is not yet held, not that the field is empty in reality.

Confidence is stated per profile and reflects how well corroborated the assessment is at the time of review. Individual fields that are thinly sourced are marked "Not assessed" rather than estimated. Sources are listed on every profile.
Viv Ansanm
Umbrella alliance · "Live Together"
HIGH confidence
Classification
Alliance of the two major gang coalitions (G9 and G-Pep) and numerous smaller factions
Leadership
Associated publicly with Jimmy "Barbecue" Cherizier as its most prominent figure; leadership is a coalition arrangement, not a single command
Territory
Greater Port-au-Prince and key access routes into the capital; reach extended into surrounding areas through 2025-26
Aims
Consolidate control across the capital, present a unified front against state and international forces, and bargain for political relevance
Tactics
Coordinated multi-gang assaults, roadblocks and control of access routes, attacks on state institutions, prisons, and infrastructure
Strength
Not assessed
Formed
Publicly announced in 2023, uniting previously rival coalitions
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • UNODC, "Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" explainer, January 2026
  • International Crisis Group, "Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance," 2025
  • ACLED, "Viv Ansanm: living together, fighting united," 2025-26
  • Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Haiti country page
G9 Family and Allies
Coalition · within Viv Ansanm
HIGH confidence
Leadership
Jimmy "Barbecue" Cherizier, a former officer of the Haitian National Police
Territory
Several communes of central and metropolitan Port-au-Prince
Aims
Presents itself in political and revolutionary terms while consolidating territorial and economic control
Tactics
Territorial control, roadblocks, extortion of commerce and transit, coordinated armed operations
Finances
Extortion and control of commerce and transit corridors
Weapons
Small arms; supply widely assessed to rely on illicit trafficking
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • Wikipedia, "Haitian conflict" (overview and leadership), accessed 2026
  • UNODC, "Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" explainer, January 2026
  • International Crisis Group, "Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance," 2025
G-Pep
Coalition · within Viv Ansanm
MODERATE confidence
Leadership
Gabriel "Ti Gabriel" Jean-Pierre
Territory
Based primarily in the Cite Soleil district of Port-au-Prince
Aims
Historically a rival of G9; now operates under the Viv Ansanm banner
Tactics
Not assessed
Finances
Not assessed
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • Al Jazeera, "Who are Haiti's gangs and what do they want," 2024
  • Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Haiti country page
400 Mawozo
Individual gang
HIGH confidence
Territory
East of Port-au-Prince, including the Croix-des-Bouquets area
Tactics
Mass kidnapping for ransom and extortion; control of key overland routes
Finances
Kidnapping ransoms and extortion
Leadership
Previously led by Germine "Yonyon" Joly, later prosecuted in the United States; subsequent command not assessed here
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • Wikipedia, "400 Mawozo," accessed 2026
  • US Department of Justice, charges against Haitian gang leaders, public releases
  • UNODC, "Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" explainer, January 2026
Gran Grif
Individual gang
HIGH confidence
Territory
Dominant in the Artibonite department, Haiti's central agricultural region
Tactics
Violent seizure of agricultural land, control of a key national road, and mass-casualty attacks on civilians
Aims
Control of farmland, road traffic, and rural commerce in the Artibonite
Leadership
Not assessed
Finances
Extortion of road traffic and agricultural commerce
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • OHCHR, "Gangs expand reach in Haiti amid persistent deadly violence," March 2026
  • UNODC, "Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" explainer, January 2026
Kraze Barye
Individual gang
MODERATE confidence
Tactics
Noted for extreme brutality and widespread human rights violations against civilians
Territory
Areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan zone
Leadership
Not assessed
Finances
Not assessed
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • OHCHR, "Gangs expand reach in Haiti amid persistent deadly violence," March 2026
  • Haitian conflict overview reporting, accessed 2026
Village de Dieu and Grand Ravine
Individual gangs · southern capital
MODERATE confidence
Leadership
Associated with the gang leader Johnson "Izo" Andre
Territory
Critical coastal and southern zones of Port-au-Prince
Tactics
Control of strategic access points; areas historically resistant to police incursion
Finances
Not assessed
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • UN News and Security Council reporting on Haiti, 2026
  • Al Jazeera, "Who are Haiti's gangs and what do they want," 2024
Delmas 6
Individual gang
MODERATE confidence
Leadership
Directly associated with Jimmy "Barbecue" Cherizier
Territory
The Delmas 6 area of Port-au-Prince
Tactics
Not assessed
Finances
Not assessed
Weapons
Not assessed
Strength
Not assessed
Last reviewed 2026-07-05
  • UNODC, "Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" explainer, January 2026
  • Al Jazeera, "Who are Haiti's gangs and what do they want," 2024
Assessment & outlook

Where this is heading, and how it is countered

This section is InterAmitica's forward-looking analytical judgement, not reported fact. It is reasoned from the open sources above and is offered for situational awareness. Judgements are labelled by likelihood and will be revised as conditions change.

Likely trajectory

What the current picture points toward.
  • Consolidation, not fragmentation (likely). The Viv Ansanm structure gives previously rival gangs a reason to coordinate. Absent sustained pressure, the alliance is more likely to deepen its hold on the capital than to break apart.
  • Outward pressure from the capital (likely). With most of Port-au-Prince already contested or controlled, expansion pressure falls on surrounding departments and the routes that feed the city, including the Artibonite.
  • Governance by armed groups (possible). Where the state is absent, gangs increasingly regulate movement, commerce, and daily life. This "criminal governance" is harder to reverse than territorial control alone.
  • Continued mass-casualty violence (likely). Reporting through 2026 documents large-scale attacks on civilians. Without a security intervention that holds ground, this pattern is likely to persist.

Countermeasures

What the source literature identifies as levers.
  • Hold, not just clear. Analyses stress that retaking territory matters only if it can be held and paired with a returning civilian state. Clearing without holding cedes ground back.
  • Choke the weapons and money. Gangs depend on trafficked small arms and on extortion revenue. Interdicting arms flows and disrupting financial pipelines target the alliance's material base.
  • Protect and rebuild communities. Restoring basic services, policing, and courts in cleared areas reduces the vacuum that gangs fill and lowers recruitment pressure.
  • Accountability and legitimacy. Credible Haitian-led governance and justice, supported rather than supplanted by international partners, is repeatedly identified as the decisive long-term factor.

Countermeasures summarise options discussed in the cited literature (including UNODC, OHCHR, Crisis Group, ReliefWeb, and CFR). They are not an endorsement of any specific operation or policy.

The registry

Armed groups, group by group

This is the live layer of the report. Each card is an individually dated entry published by InterAmitica analysts and refreshed automatically. It sits beneath the standing profiles above and grows as new verified entries are published. Fields left as "Not assessed" mean corroborated information is not yet held.

Loading the registry...
Methodology

How we gather and assess

Our information comes from people and from open sources, and it is only published once it holds up to cross-checking. We favour patterns over individuals, and we protect the people who talk to us.

How we gather

Human and open-source, combined and cross-checked.
  • Ground awareness. We maintain discreet, personal awareness of conditions on the ground. That work is quiet and deliberately modest in scope, but it produces sound, first-hand information.
  • Open-source corroboration. We add reputable public reporting from UN bodies, humanitarian agencies, and established media to test and strengthen our own picture.
  • Trusted community relationships. Religious leaders, teachers, healthcare workers, business owners, neighbourhood committees, and humanitarian organisations understand local conditions without being party to criminal activity.
  • Secure reporting channels. Anonymous tip lines, encrypted forms, and trusted intermediaries let people share information without exposing themselves.

How we verify

No single report is treated as fact on its own.
  • Cross-checking. Any single report is unconfirmed until corroborated through independent sources, public reporting, satellite imagery where appropriate, or official statements.
  • Source protection. We limit who knows a source's identity, avoid collecting unnecessary personal information, and are clear about how information will be used.
  • Patterns over individuals. Road closures, displacement, extortion trends, and shifts in local security conditions are more useful, and far less risky, than trying to identify insiders.
  • Structured analysis. We apply network and social-network mapping on public data, geospatial analysis, risk assessment, and formal source evaluation before anything is published.

Confidence ratings reflect how well corroborated an assessment is at the time of review. HIGH means multiple independent sources agree; MODERATE means partial or single-stream corroboration; LOW means a single or preliminary indication we are still testing.

Using this page

How to read the registry

For readers

Officials, partners, and the public.
  • Read the assessed profiles. The section above sets out each major armed group and coalition, with sources and a confidence rating on every profile.
  • Browse or search the registry. Below, each card is one armed group. Use the search box to find a group, a territory, or a named area.
  • Filter by confidence. Use the confidence buttons to see only high-confidence assessments when you need the firmest picture.
  • Check the sources. Open "Sources" on any profile or card to see what the assessment rests on, and note the "last verified" date.
  • Take it with you. Download the brief as a formatted PDF for offline use or circulation.

The live registry below refreshes every 5 hours as InterAmitica publishes new verified entries. You never need to do anything: the newest verified picture loads on its own.

InterAmitica
VERITAS ET VIRTUS
ZANMI · VERITE · ANALIZ

This product

Registry Methodology How to use

Contact

contact@interamitica.com Washington, DC Port-au-Prince
© 2026 InterAmitica. This registry is a structured research product compiled from human and open-source information and is provided for situational awareness. It represents InterAmitica's assessment at the time of review and does not constitute legal, security, or operational advice. Figures drawn from third parties are attributed to their sources.